



**Business Continuity Plan
For Pandemics
-Public Version-**

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1. Objective

This document regulates all measures which are taken by Fraport in case of high infectious diseases according to the protective law of infection at Frankfurt International Airport (consequently also location FRA). Objectives support the guarantee of controlled and secure airport operation as well as the protection of Fraport AG, its employees and customers.

2. The early warning system

The early-warning system of FRAPORT AG is composed of the following components:

- External monitoring of the worldwide infection surveillance.
- Monitoring of the infection cases within FRA
- Monitoring of interfaces with external partners

2.1 External monitoring of the worldwide infection

The external monitoring includes the worldwide surveillance and assessment of the medical situation. The external monitoring is constantly ensured by the responsible airport doctor/deputy of the FRAPORT AG.

In case of adequate reason the responsible airport doctor/deputy of the FRAPORT AG informs the Airport Duty Officer (ADO) concerning the evaluation of the external medical situation as well as of the current classification of the current WHO Pandemic Alert Levels (see appendix 1). The ADO informs the program leads of operational functions according to appendix 2 (in general via E-Mail or newsletter).

2.2 Internal monitoring of the infection

Key roles/players of the Fraport AG are departments which are essential and responsible for the maintenance of orderly and secure airport operation and its processes (see appendix 3).

These departments are interdependent and are self-monitored.

All executive managers of key departments define the critical staff level I, II und III.

The critical service impact level is defined as follows:

Critical Service Impact level I = the operation of processes is ensured without any loss of services

Critical Service Impact level II = the operation of processes can only be ensured with significant loss of services

Critical Service Impact level III = the operation of processes can only be ensured rudimentarily; solely emergency operation is possible

All executive managers of the key departments monitor the daily rate of absenteeism in their own department.

As soon as the critical service impact level I, II or III is reached in one department the concerned department has to inform the ADO immediately.

The ADO documents all necessary information according to the published ADO procedure and informs all operational functions as per the procedure (see appendix 2)

The executive managers of all organizational units guarantee that all process interfaces are monitored and all measures are taken in case of an imminent risk of infection.

As soon as a key department is aware that an external partner (customers, authorities etc.) is impacted by staff problems which could affect internal FRA departments the ADO must be informed immediately.

The ADO documents all necessary reporting information as per procedure.

The ADO informs the operational functional units according to appendix 2 as well as all key departments which depend on the affected key player.

„To Do List „ for the ADO (Airport Duty Officer)

Ask managers („key departments“) for the critical impact level I-III

**Cross check with the masterplan (slide 8)
(interaction between the departments)**

Decide which impact level (0-4) will result for the company

Inform all involved departments

daily information for the management

„Key Departments“

ADO

Critical impact level I = The operation of processes is ensured without any loss of services

Critical impact level II = The operation of processes can only be ensured with significant loss of services

Critical impact level III = The operation of processes can only be ensured rudimentarily:

Decides Impact level 0-4

Impact level 1 =
controlled operation

Impact level 2 =
operation with insignificant loss of services

Impact level 3 =
operation with significant loss of services


Impact level 4 =
emergency operation

Impact level 0 =
return to normal operation

3. Impacts/Impact Level

The Fraport AG defines 5 impact levels (0-4).

The impact levels assess the operational impact due to lack of staff (key players/departments) because of an infection of the Fraport AG.



	Airport Duty Officer	Airside (Airside Duty Manager)	Apron Control	Apron Supervision/Follow me	Traffic Data Center	Terminal Management (Terminal)	Terminal Management (Terminal Facilities and Equipm)
1							
2							
3							
4							
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Strictly Confidential

	Airport Duty Officer	Airside (Airside Duty Manager)	Apron Control	Apron Supervision/Follow me	Traffic Data Center	Terminal Management (Terminal)	Terminal Facilities and Equipm	Callcenter/Fault Management	Passenger Services	Passenger Bridge Operation	Loading	Freight/Bus/ Tow/Check in	Fire Brigade	Emergency Management	Parking Management	Technical Equipment Management	Maintenance and Repair	Cleaning	Technical Building Management	Technical Facility Management
1																				
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3.1 Impact Level 1 – Controlled operation/ Monitoring

Definition:

Controlled operations: No impacts due to of infectious diseases in Frankfurt/Main.

The worldwide development of the infection is continuously monitored and evaluated (external monitoring).

Measures headquarter FRA:

The executive managers of all departments take preventative measures for a potential anticipated infection.

If necessary, all Fraport employees will be informed with regard to the situation and external communication will be prepared in anticipation of being required.

Remark:

A classification to level 1 is not necessary (controlled operation)

3.2 Impact Level 2 – Operation with insignificant loss of services

Definition:

At least 1 key player/department informs ADO that Critical Service level I has occurred. In general, Critical Service level I has an impact on processes which can still be managed with internal staff. Additional or external support is not needed.

Measures headquarter FRA:

See measures Impact Level 1.

Additional: Measures according to the procedure instructions (see appendix 4)

Remark:

The upgrading of impact level 1 to impact level 2 is carried out by the ADO after consulting all operational functions in compliance with appendix 2 (see procedure instruction appendix 4).

As soon as a development occurs which requires an upgrading to level 3 the ADO activates the briefing as per defined participant list. The upgrading to level 4 as well as the convention of the crisis management group will be decided in this meeting.

3.3 Impact Level 3 – Operation with significant loss of services

Definition:

The defined critical service level II occurs at least in one department of the key players/departments. The achievement of the critical impact service level II leads to a development of incidents far beyond the controlled operation. The loss of staff cannot be compensated.

Measures headquarter FRA:

See measures FRA impact level 1 and 2.

Additional:

The crisis management group is activated. As the case may be the Emergency Response and the Information Center (ERIC) is permanently staffed in order to guarantee a continuous crisis management work.

Remark:

The crisis management group decides on further measures and impact levels (retention or upgrading to a different impact level).

3.4 Impact Level 4 – Emergency operation (part cessation of airport operation tot he point of complete stop of airport operations)

Definition:

The defined critical impact level III occurs at least in one department of the key players/departments. The achievement of the critical impact level III leads to serious impacts on controlled airport operation.

Measures headquarter FRA:

See measures FRA impact level 1, 2 and 3.

Additional: Permanent opening of the ERIC for a continuous crisis management work.

Remark:

The crisis management group decides on further measures and the upkeep or change to a different impact level.

3.5 Impact Level 0 – Return to controlled operation

3.6 (See impact level 4)

Definition:

The orderly return to controlled operation is taking place.

Measures headquarter FRA:

See measures FRA Impact Level 1, 2, 3 und 4.

Additional: Each department organizes the return to routine processes. The crisis management group coordinates the return to controlled operation.

Remark:

The crisis management group decides on the change to a different impact level.

During upgrading/downgrading from one impact level to a different one impact levels can be skipped (e. g. impact level 1 to impact level 3).

4. Commitment of the executive managers

The executive managers of all organizational units are within the parameters of their responsibility obliged to provide adequate precaution (substitute rules, necessary operational redundancies etc.) so that all processes can run smoothly despite absenteeism of employees.

As soon as the above mentioned situation is no longer guaranteed, all described procedures and information must be initiated immediately (see point 2.2).

Both, legal commitments and contracts must be achieved with reduced availability of staff. Each department prioritizes its own tasks, processes and commitments.

Measures are to be documented.

5. The crisis management group

In case of activation of the crisis management group of the Fraport AG, all rules of the BA NOT take effect (part C point 4.2).

In addition to general constitution of the crisis management group, (BA NOT, part C, 4.2.5.1.1) the following departments will be alerted:

Manager (o.r.) Human Resources
Manager (o.r.) Property and Facility Management
Manager (o.r.) Information and Communication Services
Chairman (o. r.) of the work council

6. Annexes

- Pandemic Level classification of WHO
- Operational functions (key players/departments) of Fraport AG and process partners
- List of all key players/departments of the Fraport AG
- ADO procedure state of infection

7. Appendix 1: Pandemic levels 1 to 6 of WHO

The WHO distinguishes in the pandemic plan between six different phases which are assigned to different pandemic periods.

A general objective target was formulated for each phase by the WHO:

Interpandemic Phase

Objective of the pandemic strategy

Phase 1: No confirmation for the influenza virus subtype for human beings. A subtype, which caused human infections at an earlier stage, circulates possibly in the surroundings of animals. The risk of human infections is classified as extremely low.

The preparation for a pandemic influence should be pushed on the global, national and sub-national regions.

Phase 2: No confirmation of new influenza subtypes for human beings. The circulating influenza virus concerns animals and produces a serious risk for human diseases.

The risk of a transfer to human beings should be minimized. Possible transfers should be detected and announced as soon as possible.

Pandemic warning phase:

Objective of the pandemic strategy:

Phase 3: Human infections with a new subtype but no expansion from human being to human being or extremely rare cases in the case of close contact.

An immediate characterization of new virus subtypes as well as the early proof, the information and reaction must be guaranteed.

Phase 4: Small cluster with limited transfer from human being to human being. The areal expansion is highly limited, so that one can emanate from a partial expansion to human beings.

The new virus should be curtailed or the expansion must be slowed down in order to win enough time for preliminary measures as well as the development of vaccine.

Phase 5: Large cluster, the expansion from human being to human being is still localized.

All efforts to minimize the expansion or slowing down the virus should be maximized in order to avoid a pandemic or to win enough time for preliminary measures.

It should be emanated, that the virus is much better adapted to human beings but continuing localized but not optimally transferable (high risk of a pandemic).

Phase 6:

Increasing and lasting transfer within the human population.

Phase 6 differentiates whether

- 1) a country is not affected
- 2) a country is affected or is having close trade-or travel relations to an affected country
- 3) the infection is declining or
- 4) a second pandemic wave is coming back

Postpandemic Phase

As per inter pandemic phase

Origin: "WHO global influenza preparedness plan. The role of WHO and recommendations for national measures before and during pandemics".

WHO 2005.

Comment:

The differentiation between phase 1 and phase 2 is based on human infection risks or diseases which are caused by animal subtypes. Different factors and their relative signification are integrated according to the academic state of knowledge in the differentiation. This could include the following factors: The pathogenicity of animals and human beings; infection of pets and farm animals or only wild animals. Whether the virus is localized enzoonotic or epizoonotic or extremely widespread information of the viral genome analysis and/or further academic information.

The differentiation between phase 3, phase 4 and phase 5 is based on the valuation of the pandemic risk. Different factors and their relative signification according to the academic state of knowledge can be considered at this. This could include the following factors: Transmission rate; geographic localization widespread; severity of the disease; genes of human subtypes (in case the virus descends from an avian subtype: additional information of the viral genome analysis and/or further academic information.

Origin: Federal Ministry of the Interior – 2009 (Germany)

8. Appendix 2: Operational functions of the Fraport AG and process partners

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Appendix 3

9. List of key players/departments of the Fraport AG

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